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MORAL DUTIES AND DIVINE COMMANDS:  
IS KANTIAN RELIGION COHERENT?
Micah Lott
Kant argues that morality leads to religion, and that religion consists in regard-
ing our moral duties as divine commands. This paper explores a foundational 
question for Kantian religion: When you think of your duties as divine com-
mands, what exactly are you thinking, and how is that thought consistent 
with Kant’s own account of the ways that morality is independent from God? 
I argue that if we assume the Kantian religious person acts out of obedience to 
God, then her overall outlook will be inconsistent. I then develop an account 
of regarding duties as divine commands that does not involve acting out of 
obedience to God. This account, however, faces an objection—that without 
obedience, one cannot actually be thinking of duties as divine commands. In 
the final section, I consider this objection and suggest a response.
1. Duty, Divine Commands, and Kantian Religion
Immanuel Kant holds two positions that appear to stand in tension with one 
another, if not outright contradiction. On the one hand, Kant claims that moral-
ity leads to religion, and that religion consists in regarding God as the moral 
lawgiver and our moral duties as divine commands. On the other hand, Kant 
insists that we do not need any thought about God in order to recognize our 
moral duties or to be motivated to act morally—and he appears to reject a divine 
command theory of morality, on the grounds that it is based in heteronomy 
and offers a material, rather than formal, principle of morality.1 Here are some 
examples of Kant making the first point, about duties as divine commands:
Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends 
itself to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside the human being, in 
whose will the ultimate end (of the creation of the world) is what can and at 
the same time ought to be the ultimate human end.2
1See Groundwork 4:441–445, esp.  4:443, and Critique of Practical Reason, 5:39–41. For an 
argument that the Groundwork passage is directed specifically at the position of Crucius, and 
not all divine command theories, see Hare, God and Morality, 152–155. In Critique of Practical 
Reason, Kant cites Crucius as a proponent of the view he is rejecting. The translations of 
Kant’s texts used here are listed in the References.
2Kant, Religion, 6:6.
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Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine com-
mands, i.e. as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue.3
[A]ll religion consists in this, that in all our duties we look upon [ansehen] 
God as the lawgiver to be honored universally.4
Here are some examples of Kant making the second point, about the inde-
pendence of morality from God:
Hence the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way 
that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and just because of this 
as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).5
Pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives (to the human being) a uni-
versal law which we call the moral law.6
Moreover, it is not to be understood by this that it is necessary to assume the 
existence of God as a ground of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has 
been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason itself).7
So far as morality is based on the conception of the human being as one who 
is free but who also, just because of that, binds himself through his reason to 
unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea of another being above 
him in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an incentive 
other than the law itself . . . Hence on its own behalf morality in no way needs 
religion (whether objectively, as regards willing, or subjectively, as regards 
capability) but is rather self-sufficient by virtue of pure practical reason.8
Looking at these passages together, a reader might reasonably wonder: 
what gives? If morality is grounded in the autonomy of reason, and if we 
have no need of God to recognize our moral duties and observe them, and 
if we don’t lose sight of these points about morality, then what are we sup-
posed to be doing when we regard our moral duties as divine commands 
given by God the mighty moral lawgiver? This question is closely related 
to, but distinct from, the question of why Kant thinks we must regard our 
duties as divine commands—i.e., why Kant believes that morality leads to 
religion. In this paper, I will touch on the why question, but my focus will 
be on the more basic what question. Put simply: when one thinks of one’s 
moral duties as divine commands, what exactly is one thinking—and how 
is that thought consistent with Kant’s own account of morality’s inde-




6Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:31.
7Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:125.
8Kant, Religion, 6:3.
9Of course, the best way to figure out the nature and content of this thought might be to 
consider why Kant believes we must regard our duties this way. Even so, it is worth keeping 
in mind that these are distinct issues. Works that focus on the why question include: Hare, 
“Kant on Recognizing Our Duties”; Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil”; Kain, 
“Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands.”
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is at the heart of Kant’s rational religion, this question is asking about the 
central and defining attitude of the Kantian religious person.10
We might assume that fulfilling duties that we regard as divine com-
mands is the same as obeying God. Call this the Obedience Assumption. 
The Obedience Assumption is natural and prima facie reasonable, both on 
conceptual and textual grounds. If you take yourself to have been com-
manded to do something, and you do it for that reason, that sure looks like 
obedience. And Kant speaks often about obedience to commands, declar-
ing at one point that “commands are laws that must be obeyed.”11 Thus to 
think of duties as divine commands seems to be the same as thinking them 
as laws given by God that must be obeyed. And to fulfill one’s duties from 
such a thought seems to be the same as obeying God. It is no surprise, then, 
that John Hare describes the Kantian religious person as acting “out of 
obedience to God.”12
But given the Obedience Assumption, it becomes difficult to see how 
the Kantian religious person could occupy a coherent point of view. In 
the next section, I consider some features of obedience to commands in 
ordinary human contexts. I argue that the more we think about what is 
involved in obeying commands, the harder it becomes to see how one 
could recognize moral duties as divine commands while also maintain-
ing Kant’s claims about morality’s independence from God.13 In §3, I con-
sider the interpretations of Kantian religion offered by Allen Wood and 
John Hare, respectively. I  argue that so long as we retain the Obedience 
Assumption, neither interpretation can make the Kantian religious out-
look consistent.14 In §4, I offer an account of regarding duties as divine 
commands in which the Kantian religious person does not act out of obe-
dience to divine commands (or, equivalently, out of obedience to God). 
This account of the Kantian religious attitude avoids the problems that 
10By “Kantian religious person” I do not mean any religious person who might also be 
described as a “Kantian” in some meaningful sense. I mean an adherent of Kantian rational 
religion as laid out by Kant, especially in Religion.
11Kant, Groundwork, 4:416.
12Hare, “Kant on Recognizing Our Duties,” 469.
13A.T. Nuyen notes a tension in Kant’s statements, some of which sound like those of a 
“Divine Command Theorist” and others those of a “Moral Autonomy Theorist.” And Nuyen 
attempts to show how Kant’s statements are consistent. But he does not bring into view 
the problem that interests me here, about how to conceive of the attitude of the Kantian 
religious person, and in particular the way (if any) that the Kantian religious person can 
be said to fulfill her moral duties from obedience to God. See Nuyen, “Is Kant a Divine 
Command Theorist?” Likewise, the problem for Kant’s view that I raise here is not discussed 
by Firestone and Jacobs in their extended treatment of challenges to Kant’s Religion. See 
Firestone and Jacobs, In Defense.
14Hare clearly affirms what I am calling the Obedience Assumption. See Hare, “Kant on 
Recognizing Our Duties,” 469; Hare, “Kant’s Divine Command Theory,” 272–274. It is less 
clear that Wood affirms the Obedience Assumption, but there are strong suggestions that he 
does, at least in some places. See Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 501–502, 
507–508. In any case, my goal is not to attack these two interpreters, but to explore the issues 
that arise once we assume that the person who fulfills duties regarded as divine commands 
acts out of obedience to God.
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arise from obedience, but it faces a difficulty of its own—that without 
obedience to God, the Kantian religious person is not actually thinking of 
moral duties as divine commands. In the final section, I consider this objec-
tion and suggest a possible response.
2. Commands, Obedience, and Morality
Kant says that morality leads through the concept of the highest good 
to religion, which is “the recognition [Erkenntis] of all duties as divine com-
mands.” Moral duties must “be regarded [angesehen werden] as com-
mands of the Supreme being.”15 Our question is what this recognition 
involves, what regarding moral duties this way consists in. It seems 
reasonable to start with the attitude of obedience to commands, and 
to consider ordinary instances of obedience. After all, commands are 
a familiar feature of human life—e.g., a sergeant commands a private 
to dig a ditch, a parent orders her child to clean his room. Why not 
suppose that regarding duties as divine commands, and fulfilling them 
as such, can be understood along the same lines as the attitude of the 
private who obeys his sergeant or the child who obeys his parent? That 
is what I  am calling the Obedience Assumption. The problem with 
this approach is that our ordinary notion of obedience to commands 
appears to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the independence 
of morality from God.
To see the problem, consider a simple case: A sergeant orders a pri-
vate to dig a ditch, and the private obeys by digging a ditch. If we ask 
the obedient private why he dug the ditch, then he can reply, “Because 
my commanding officer ordered me to dig it.” In a different scenario, 
the private might have heard the command, but then dug the ditch sim-
ply because he thought it was a good idea. Or he might have dug the 
ditch “because” the sergeant ordered him to do it, but only in the sense 
that the sergeant’s order alerted him to the fact that the ditch needed 
digging—e.g., without it, there would be a flood in the camp. But in 
those cases, the private will not have obeyed the sergeant’s command, 
even though he will have done the thing he was commanded to do. To 
obey a command, I must act as commanded because I have been com-
manded. As Robert Paul Wolff says: “Obedience is not a matter of doing 
what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of doing what he tells you to 
do because he tells you to do it.”16
When I obey a command, the fact of the command is essential to my rea-
son for acting. And in acting because I have been commanded, I acknowl-
edge the commander’s practical authority over me—i.e., her right to be 
obeyed, and her capacity to give me decisive reason to do (certain) things 
by ordering me to do them. An act of commanding presupposes such 
authority as the ground of the command’s normative significance for the 
15Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:129.
16Quoted in Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority,” § 2.
61MORAL DUTIES AND DIVINE COMMANDS
recipient of the command.17 Hence if a fellow private, rather than a ser-
geant, starts ordering me to dig ditches, I can reject his “commands” as 
presuming an authority that he in fact lacks. Colloquially put: You’re not 
the boss of me.
Suppose, then, that we apply this familiar sort of obedience to com-
mands to the case of regarding our moral duties as divine commands. In 
ordinary cases, obeying a command means being in a position to explain 
why you did something by saying something like: “Because she told me 
to, and she’s the boss.” Thus if we ask the Kantian religious person (who 
regards moral duties as divine commands) why she fulfills some duty, e.g. 
keeping her promises, she will be able to say: “Because God told me to, 
and God is the boss.” Likewise, in ordinary cases of obedience one takes 
the command to have a normative significance that is grounded in the 
commander’s practical authority. Understood along these lines, the per-
son who regards moral duties as divine commands must think of moral 
duties as having a normative significance that is based in God’s practical 
authority.
The problem, however, is that this way of thinking about one’s moral 
duties conflicts with Kant’s claims about the independence of morality 
from God. First, it conflicts with Kant’s claim that, in morality, a per-
son does not need “the idea of another being above him in order that he 
recognize his duty.”18 For in ordinary cases of recognizing and obeying 
a command, the idea of another being above you is precisely what you 
need to have in mind—“above” in the sense of having practical authority 
over you. Second, it conflicts with Kant’s claim that we are not required 
17Mark Murphy denies this: “But sincere commanding requires not belief in one’s author-
ity but, at most, belief that one possesses some superiority relevant to the modification of rea-
sons for action through the speech-act. A bully can, without possessing practical authority, 
give commands, in part because he or she has, through physical strength or other means of 
making other’s lives unpleasant, the capacity to modify the reasons for action others have by 
his or her commands. The commander does not as such imply that he or she is an authority 
over the commanded” (An Essay on Divine Authority, 28).
I like Murphy’s example, but I think it supports the opposite conclusion from the one that 
he draws. Consider what we would naturally say to a bully who is bossing people around: 
“Who do you think you are to tell people what to do? Who made you king? You’re not the 
boss around here. Stop telling people what to do!” Such a response highlights the fact that 
the bully’s acts of commanding indeed presuppose practical authority. In giving commands, 
the bully is acting as if he had authority. And in rejecting him as a mere bully, rather than a 
genuine authority, we are saying that his presumption of authority is false—that, in fact, he 
has no right to order us around. Of course, we might nevertheless comply with the bully’s 
demands for prudential reasons, especially if he has the power to make our lives miserable. 
But in dealing with a bully this way, we are not really obeying his commands as commands.
In any case, what is really crucial to my argument is not that sincere commanding pre-
supposes practical authority. What matters is that there is a central type of obedience that 
involves recognizing the practical authority of another person. That is the sort of obedience 
that is relevant here, since Kant clearly does not think that God is a bully. And whatever rec-
ognizing duties as divine commands involves, it cannot be like our “obedience” to a bully, 
where we comply for merely prudential reasons.
18Kant, Religion, 6:3.
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to “assume the existence of God as a ground of all obligation in general (for 
this rests, as has been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason 
itself).”19 For if God is not the ground of obligation, and if the ground of 
obligation is rather the autonomy of reason, then how can it be correct to 
regard our moral duties as having a normative significance that is based 
in God’s practical authority over us—i.e. to fulfill them in an attitude of 
obedience to divine commands? And third, if pure practical reason “gives 
(to the human being) a universal law which we call the moral law,” then it 
looks like a mistake to obey the moral law out of obedience to God con-
ceived as the mighty moral lawgiver.20 If anyone is the boss here, it would 
seem to be pure practical reason, not God.
Might we resolve these worries if we suppose that the Kantian reli-
gious person thinks of moral obligation as grounded both in pure practical 
reason and in God’s practical authority? After all, there is nothing strange 
about a private who thinks both (a) that digging the ditch is a good idea, 
because it will prevent a flood in the camp, and (b) that he has decisive 
reason to dig the ditch anyway, because his sergeant has ordered him to 
do so. Might not the outlook of the Kantian religious person have a simi-
lar structure? Her reasons to fulfill her moral duties would be overdeter-
mined, and she would understand them as such.
I will return to this suggestion in §4 below. But for now, what matters 
is that it does not solve the difficulties raised by the idea of obedience 
to divine commands. There is indeed nothing strange about the outlook 
of the private who digs a ditch out of obedience, while also recognizing 
that digging the ditch is simply a good idea. But the issue here is what is 
internal to his motivation insofar as he acts from obedience. And insofar as 
he acts from obedience, there is an importance sense in which the action’s 
being a good idea is neither here nor there. Qua someone who acts from 
obedience, he does not dig the ditch because it will prevent a flood, but 
because he has been commanded to do so. This is brought out by the fact it 
can make sense for a private to dig a ditch out of obedience even if he has 
no understanding of why it is a good idea, or even if he believes (perhaps 
correctly) that it is a bad idea.
In the case of Kantian religion, the parallel with the soldier would be 
someone who thinks both (a) that morality is independent of God in all 
the ways that Kant insists, and (b) that she has reason to fulfill her moral 
duties because God has commanded her to do so. The problems emerge 
when we think about what is internal to her motivation insofar as she acts 
from obedience. For if the Kantian religious person is like the obedient 
private, then there is an important sense in which further considerations 
are neither here nor there: qua someone who acts out of obedience to God, 
she does not fulfill his moral duties for any reason other than because God 
commands her to. And that looks like a mistake, given Kant’s own account 
of morality’s independence from God. Obedience at best fails to bring into 
19Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:125.
20Kant, Groundwork, 4:431.
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view, and at worse it seriously misrepresents, the idea that moral obli-
gations are grounded in our nature as free beings and in self-legislation. 
Nor does obedience fit with the claim that the person who acts dutifully 
“is in need neither of the idea of another being above him in order that he 
recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an incentive other than the 
law itself.”21
So it looks like obedience—or at least obedience in the familiar sense—
cannot be the right way to understand what it means to regard our 
moral duties as divine commands. This suggests that, for Kant, regard-
ing our duties as divine commands is not the same as obeying divine 
commands—i.e., that we should jettison the Obedience Assumption. 
I explore this idea in §4 below. First, however, I will consider two inter-
pretations of Kantian religion. My goal in considering these two inter-
pretations is to show that if we assume that regarding duties as divine 
commands is the same as obedience to God, then Kant’s overall position 
remains inconsistent on either interpretation.
3. Two Recent Interpretations of Kant and Divine Commands
3.1. Wood: Duties, Divine Commands, and Ethical Community
Allen Wood sums up Kantian religion this way: “To be religious, for Kant, 
is to view all one’s duties as commands issued to one by God.”22 At the 
same time, Wood says, Kant holds that morality is independent from 
divine commands in at least four ways: (1) God’s will is not the ground 
of moral obligation. (2) God’s commands do not provide the motivation 
for fulfilling our moral duties. (3) God’s commands do not determine the 
content of our moral duties. (4) We do not acquire knowledge of our moral 
duties from special divine revelation.23
In discussing duties and divine commands, Wood’s primary focus is on 
what I earlier called the why question: If morality is independent of God in 
these ways, why should moral agents consider their duties as divine com-
mands?24 The best answer, Wood argues, lies in Kant’s idea of ethical com-
munity. Morality requires that we pursue the highest good, happiness in 
proportion to virtue. Because of the social sources of evil in human beings, 
the pursuit of the highest good must be a collective pursuit—a union of 
individuals working toward the same end—and thus morality requires 
that we join with others in an ethical community.25 In this community, the 
21Kant, Religion, 6:3.
22Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 498.
23Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 500.
24This is true in both Wood, “Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion,” and Wood, 
“Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil.”
25As Kant says: “The highest good cannot be achieved merely by the exertion of the single 
individual toward his own moral perfection, but instead requires a union of such individuals 
into a whole working toward the same end - a system of well-disposed human beings, in 
which and through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass” (Religion 
6:97–98).
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moral law is a universally valid public law, recognized by all. The members 
of this community must regard themselves as bound by the commands of 
a common lawgiver. But unlike the members of a juridical community, 
the members of an ethical community cannot regard themselves as the 
lawgiver. For they cannot know each other’s innermost motivations, and 
the laws of an ethical community apply to innermost motivation, not mere 
outer compliance. Thus the lawgiver of an ethical community must be 
conceived as someone who “knows the heart” of the people. Because only 
God knows the heart, only God is fit to be conceived as the lawgiver of an 
ethical community.26 As Kant says:
There must therefore be someone other than the people whom we can 
declare the public lawgiver of an ethical community. But neither can ethical 
laws be thought of as proceeding originally [ursprünglich ausgehend] merely 
from the will of this superior (as statutes [Statute] that would not be bind-
ing without his prior sanction [Befehl]) for then they would not be ethical 
laws, and the duty commensurate to them would not be free virtue but an 
enforceable legal duty. Therefore only such a one can be thought of as the 
supreme lawgiver of an ethical community, with respect to whom all true 
duties, hence also the ethical, must be represented as at the same time his 
commands; consequently, he must also be one who knows the heart in order 
to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the dispositions of each and every-
one and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the worth 
of his actions. But this is the concept of God as a moral ruler of the world. 
Hence an ethical community is conceivable only as a people under divine 
commands, i.e. as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws 
of virtue.27
Wood claims that this notion of God as supreme lawgiver is consistent 
with Kant’s claims about morality’s independence from God. The key, 
according to Wood, is that “Kant distinguishes the legislator of the law, the 
one who issues a command and may attach sanctions to it, from the law’s 
author, the one whose will imposes the obligation to obey it.”28 We are to 
regard God as the legislator, or lawgiver, of the moral law. This means 
supposing that God commands the law and attaches sanctions to it. (To 
speak about attaching sanctions here is, I take it, a way of describing God’s 
role in guaranteeing that happiness is proportional to virtue within the 
highest good.) But we are not to regard God as the author of the moral law. 
Rather, “only the idea of the rational will of every rational being as such 
26For a challenge to Wood’s claim that the community is essential for explaining 
Kant’s invocation of divine commands, see Kain, “Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine 
Commands,” 139: “Why think that a divine intention to judge and reward or punish the 
behavior of everyone in a community would constitute a command, while a divine inten-
tion to reward or punish a solitary individual would fail to constitute a command (as Wood 
seems to imply)? . . . What is essential to the notion of command on Kant’s account is that a 
will promulgates a rule with an eye toward judicial and executive determinations of reward 
and punishment, whether for one or many.”
27Kant, Religion, 6:99.
28Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 507.
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can be conceived as its author.”29 And thus, Wood claims, we can consist-
ently think of God as the moral lawgiver while maintaining that morality 
is independent from God in the four ways noted above. For regarding God 
as lawgiver, and our moral duties as divine commands, does not require 
appealing to God’s will in order to explain: (a) the ground of moral obli-
gation, or (b) moral motivation, or (c) the content of our moral duties, or 
(d) our knowledge of our moral duties.
However, there are two issues with Wood’s appeal to Kant’s distinc-
tion between the legislator of the law and the author of the law. The 
first issue is a lack of textual support. Wood interprets Kant as holding 
that the author of the law, but not the legislator, is the one whose will 
imposes the obligation to obey it. But that does not seem to fit with 
Kant’s texts. In his lectures on ethics from the late 1770s, Kant says 
that a legislator, even when he is not the author of the laws, is able to 
impose the obligation of acting in accordance with them.30 And in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that the legislator, even when he is not 
the author of the laws, is “the author (autor) of the obligation in accord-
ance with the law.”31
The second issue concerns the Obedience Assumption and the dif-
ficulties we considered in the last section. So long as we maintain that 
the proper response to a divine command is obedience, then even if 
we grant Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s distinction between legisla-
tor and author, that distinction is not sufficient to make Kant’s view 
consistent. As noted above, obedience to a command as a command 
requires that one takes the fact of being commanded to give one deci-
sive reason to act as commanded, and that one regards that reason as 
grounded in the practical authority of the commander.32 Thus if one 
thinks of moral duties as the commands of God, and if one obeys them 
as such, then one must regard the authority of those commands—their 
bindingness—as grounded in God’s authority. But how is that differ-
ent from thinking of God as the one whose will imposes the obliga-
tion to obey the law, which is an idea that Wood rejects? The attitude 
of obedience to a superior’s command seems incompatible with the 
conception of a superior (in this case, the legislator) as one who issues 
commands but whose will does not impose an obligation to obey. So 
if we assume that regarding duties as divine commands is a matter of 
obedience to God, then the attitude of the Kantian religious person will 
not be appropriate to what God really is—namely, a (mere) legislator 
whose will does not impose an obligation to obey. Given the Obedience 
Assumption, the outlook of the Kantian religious person, as conceived 
by Wood, remains inconsistent.
29Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 507.
30Kant, Lectures on Ethics. See the section “Of the Lawgiver,” 76–77.
31Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:227.
32Of course, the practical authority of the commander need not be ultimate. That author-
ity might itself be grounded in something else.
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3.2. Hare: Asymmetrical Joint Authorship of the Obligation to Obey
John Hare offers a different interpretation of Kant’s claims about moral 
duties and divine commands. Whereas Wood holds that God does not in 
any way impose the obligation to obey the moral law, Hare argues that 
God does impose the obligation, although God does so together with us. 
Hare claims that by the time Kant wrote the Groundwork he was operating 
with a distinction between two kinds of author: “There is the author of the 
law and there is the author of the obligation in accordance with the law. Put 
carefully, it turns out that God and we can be jointly seen as authors in one 
sense, namely authors of the obligation of the law, and neither God nor we 
can be seen as authors of the law directly.”33 Moreover, even though we are 
with God jointly authors of the obligation of the law, this joint authorship 
is not symmetrical. The moral law applies to us as rational beings who are 
members of the kingdom of ends. God also belongs to this kingdom, but 
not as a member. Rather God is the head of the kingdom. Thus, according 
to Hare, there is an asymmetry in our joint authorship of the obligation of 
the law: “We ordinary moral agents have to see our role as recapitulating 
in our own wills the declaration in God’s will of our duties. This is how 
we are lawgivers; we declare a correspondence of our wills with the law 
(which we do not create). For me to will the law autonomously is to make 
it my law.”34
Hare fleshes out this picture by comparing it to examples of ordinary 
authority. One example is a student who takes a logic course because doing 
so is required by his department.35 Another example is a citizen who pays 
her taxes because doing so is required by the law. Both of these, Hare says, 
are instances of autonomous submission. Each person acts autonomously as 
a student or as a citizen precisely by willingly submitting to an obligation. 
And the same thing can be said of our moral duties conceived as divine com-
mands: “To extend this analysis to the context of divine command theory, 
we could say that an agent acts autonomously out of her practical identity 
as a citizen of God’s kingdom only if she acts out of obedience to God.”36 
In every case, the agent’s obedience is autonomous because the agent and 
the authority have a shared end, and “there is nothing heteronomous about 
willing to obey a superior’s prescription because the superior has prescribed 
it, as long as the final end is shared between us.”37 With respect to moral-
ity, that shared end is the highest good, in which morality is proportioned 
to happiness: “The point of morality is to further one’s own perfection and 
the happiness of others. The kingdom of ends is the place where these two 
goals coincide.”38 Thus, according to Hare, to regard moral duties as divine 
33Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 462.
34Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 462. See also Hare, God’s Call, 92–97.
35Hare, “Kant on Recognizing Our Duties,” 468–471, and Hare, “Kant’s Divine Command 
Theory,” 267–272. The example of the student is borrowed from Christine Korsgaard.
36Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 469.
37Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 471.
38Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 467.
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commands is to think of them as duties that pertain to one as a citizen of 
the kingdom of ends, in which God is the head who has “combined in one 
person the legislative, executive and judicial functions which Kant thinks 
should be separated in a well-run earthly republic.”39
Hare disagrees with Wood about the relationship between moral obli-
gation and the divine will. But Hare’s interpretation also faces difficulties, 
again arising from the notion of obedience. The basic problem is this: If 
the Kantian religious person acts from obedience to God, and we construe 
divine commands as similar to authoritative prescriptions like depart-
mental rules or civil laws, then its hard to see how the attitude of the 
Kantian religious person is consistent with Kant’s claims about the inde-
pendence of morality from God. Hare is concerned to show that submis-
sion to divine commands need not be heteronomous—that there is such 
a thing as autonomous submission to authority. Let us grant that. Even so, 
fulfilling one’s moral duties as an act of autonomous obedience to God 
still requires one to act from some thought about God as an authority who 
issues commands. And that seems to conflict with Kant’s claim in the pref-
ace to Religion: “So far as morality is based on the conception of the human 
being as one who is free but who also, just because of that, binds himself 
through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea 
of another being above him in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that 
he observe it, of an incentive other than the law itself.”40 In cases like the 
student or the citizen, their autonomous submission does need the idea of 
another being above them—i.e., whoever has established the departmen-
tal policies, in the one case, or the tax laws, in the other.
Hare has a reply to this worry. According to Hare, the preface to Religion 
assumes a distinction between what human beings are qua free beings and 
what human beings are qua dependent beings or “creatures of need.” On 
this interpretation, Kant’s point is that so far as we are free, we have no need 
of a being over us, and in that way morality on its own behalf does not need 
religion. However, we are also dependent beings, and “our morality needs 
religion because of the sort of beings we are . . . We belong to two worlds 
(sensible and insensible) and, as such, we do need the idea of a being over 
us, and of an incentive other than morality.”41 What Hare has in mind here is 
Kant’s argument that the highest good requires us to postulate the existence 
of God. Because we are creatures of need we unavoidably seek our own 
happiness. Morality commands us to pursue the highest good, in which 
happiness is proportioned to virtue. But “we cannot adopt this end as an 
intended consequence without believing it possible; and we cannot believe 
it possible without assuming “a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent 
being who alone can unite the two elements of this good.” This requires us 
to believe not merely in the possibility but the actual existence of God.”42
39Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties,” 469. See also Hare God’s Call, 109–114.
40Kant, Religion, 6:3.
41Hare, God and Morality, 163.
42Hare, God and Morality, 165.
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This reply, however, does not solve the problem about obedience to 
God. Let us grant that, for Kant, the pursuit of the highest good requires 
us to believe in the existence of God. This yields belief in God conceived 
as the guarantor of the highest good. But conceiving of God this way is 
not the same as conceiving of God as a superior who issues commands 
that we must obey. This is true even if we suppose that God wills the 
highest good, and that God wills for us to pursue the highest good. It 
is one thing to think, “I must pursue the highest good, and the highest 
good is only possible if God exists, and in pursuing the highest good I am 
doing what God wills me to do and taking up the same end as God.” It is 
another thing to think, “I must pursue the highest good (or fulfill any of 
my duties) because God commands me to do so.” Obedience requires the 
second attitude, not merely the first. And even if Kant’s argument from 
the highest good shows that we must adopt the first attitude, it does not 
show that we must adopt the second attitude. Nor does it reveal how the 
second attitude is consistent with Kant’s claims about the independence 
of morality from God. So even if qua dependent beings we do need “the 
idea of a being over us,” this is not the idea of God as a superior who 
issues authoritative commands that must be obeyed. This is not a being 
“over us” in the same sense that departmental authority is over the student 
or the political authority is over the citizen—i.e., it is not the idea of God 
as a practical authority. Furthermore, the idea of God as the guarantor 
of the highest good does nothing to answer the question: Why is even 
autonomous obedience to God appropriate, if it is actually pure practical 
reason, rather than God, that “gives (to the the human being) a universal 
law which we call the moral law”?
And so the problems generated by the Obedience Assumption remain. 
If regarding duties as divine commands is the same as obeying God’s com-
mands, then the characteristic attitude of the Kantian religious person is 
incompatible with Kant’s own claims about the independence of morality 
from God.
4. From Duty and In Hope
Let us take stock. Kant claims that we should regard our moral duties as 
divine commands. Our question is: what we are supposed to be doing 
when we regard our duties this way? The most natural answer is that we 
are taking God as an authority whom we should obey, analogous to prac-
tical authorities like parents, teachers, or political rulers. But features of 
obedience show that this attitude is inconsistent with Kant’s central claims 
about morality. And thus the overall outlook of the Kantian religious per-
son looks inconsistent. Furthermore, whatever insights we might glean 
from the nuanced interpretations of Wood and Hare, they are not suffi-
cient to solve this problem.
Given the difficulties that arise from the Obedience Assumption, it 
seems reasonable to attempt an interpretation of Kant’s religious per-
son that abandons this assumption. In this section, I  develop such an 
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interpretation. Let us start with a passage from the second section of 
Groundwork, where Kant says this about commands:
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for 
a will, is called a command (of reason) [Gebot (der Vernunft)], and the formula 
of the command is called an imperative. All imperatives are expressed by 
an ought and indicate by this the relation of an objective law of reason to a 
will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a 
necessitation).43
A few pages later, Kant says that “commands are laws that must be 
obeyed, that is, must be followed even against inclination.”44 In short, a 
practical law presents an action as practically necessary—as good, or to be 
done—and the concept of a moral law includes the idea of absolute prac-
tical necessity, as applying to all beings regardless of their inclination or 
purposes.45 What the concept of command adds to the concept of law is 
the idea of necessitation, an action’s being practically necessary in the face 
of inclinations that may not align with the law.46 As Kant says:
[I]f reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the 
will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not 
always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself 
completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human 
beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjec-
tively contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with 
objective laws is necessitation.47
Unlike human beings, God does not have contingent needs and subjective 
inclinations. Thus God is not subject to commands or imperatives. But this 
does not mean that the divine will is lawless. Rather, the divine will nec-
essarily accords with the moral law, and hence the notion of necessitation 
is out of place:
A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective laws 
(of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to 
actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, 
it can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence 
no imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the 
43Kant, Groundwork, 4:413.
44Kant, Groundwork, 4:416.
45In the preface to the Groundwork, Kant cites one of the Ten Commandments to illustrate 
the absolute necessity of moral laws: “Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, 
that is, as a ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the 
command ‘thou shalt not lie’ does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings 
did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called” (4:389). Given 
that the Ten Commandments are a paradigm case—probably the paradigm case – of divine 
commands, it is noteworthy that Kant does not mention God or the divine will in this passage.
46Although an imperative is the formula of a command, and there are hypothetical 
imperatives, Kant prefers to reserve the term command for a categorical imperative. See 
Groundwork 4:416.
47Kant, Groundwork, 4:412–413.
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“ought” is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord 
with the law.48
Kant reiterates this point in the Critique of Practical Reason, where he says 
that the “supremely self-sufficient intelligence” is properly represented as 
“incapable of any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a 
law.”49 That is why the divine will is holy.
A striking feature of Kant’s definition of a command is that it does not 
include any mention of an authority who issues commands. A command 
is an objective principle with necessitation, and it seems that a command 
per se does not require someone who commands. In this respect, Kant’s 
abstract notion of command differs from the kind of ordinary commands 
given by sergeants, teachers, or other practical authorities. For in those 
cases, a command implies a superior who commands.50
However, even if the general concept of a command does not require 
a commander, it seems that a divine command must have a commander. 
What else could a divine command be, if not a command issued by God? 
Kant surely recognizes this. Perhaps that is why, when discussing the rec-
ognition of duties as divine commands, Kant is quick to distinguish com-
mands from sanctions (Sanktionen), which also imply a commander:
In this way the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good, 
as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the 
recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions—that is, chosen and 
in themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will—but as essential laws of 
every free will in itself, which must nevertheless be regarded as commands 
of the supreme being because only from a will that is morally perfect (holy 
and beneficent) and at the same time all-powerful, and so through harmony 
with this will, can we hope to attain the highest good, which the moral law 
makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavors.51
Unlike the abstract concept of a command, the concept of a sanction does 
imply a commander from whose will the ordinance (verordnung) proceeds. 
And that might suggest that divine commands, which proceed from the 
divine will, are actually sanctions. But Kant emphatically denies this, 
48Kant, Groundwork, 4:414.
49Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:32.
50We sometimes speak about something other than a person issuing a command—e.g. 
“The posted sign commands us not to go beyond this fence.” But there is no puzzle here. 
The sign is not really the commander but a statement of the command. The commander is 
whoever put up the sign as a directive to would-be fence crossers.
51Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:129. In this passage, Kant appears to be defining sanc-
tions (Sanktionen) as “chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will.” 
This is an odd way of defining sanctions, which are typically understood not as ordinances 
themselves but as the penalities that attend the violation of an ordinance. Perhaps, then, 
Kant’s real intention is not to offer a definition of sanctions, but to point out a type of ordi-
nance that is accompanied by sanctions. Or perhaps “sanctions” is not really the best trans-
lation of Sanktionen in this passage. In any case, these issues do not undermine the substance 
of my proposed interpretation of the Kantian religious attitude. Thanks to Mark Murphy for 
encouraging me to think about this issue.
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because sanctions are chosen and in themselves contingent (sich selbst 
zufällige), whereas moral duties are not. Rather moral duties are “essential 
laws of every free will in itself”—a truth that would be lost if we thought 
of moral duties as divine sanctions.
I take it that a sergeant ordering a private to dig a ditch would be an 
example of an ordinance that is chosen and contingent. The sergeant 
decides to give the order, and he could have ordered otherwise—e.g., he 
might have ordered the private to clean the latrine, instead, and in that 
case it would have been latrine-cleaning, rather than ditch-digging, that 
was the action to be done. Kant wants to be clear that regarding our duties 
as divine commands does not mean thinking of them like that. At the same 
time, the idea of a divine command, unlike the most general and abstract 
concept of a command, does imply the will of another. In particular, it 
implies a will that is morally perfect and all-powerful. So in thinking of 
our duties as divine commands we are to be thinking of them as both: (1) 
directives related to the will of another, and in that respect similar to ordi-
nary commands, and (2) necessary and essential laws of every free will in 
itself, and for that reason not mere contingent ordiances but commands 
that possess unconditional, objective, and universal validity.
In connection to this, consider the passage from Religion quoted above 
in section three. There Kant argues that an ethical community is conceiv-
able only as a people under divine commands. But even so the laws of 
an ethical community cannot be thought of as “proceeding originally 
[ursprünglich ausgehend] merely from the will of this superior (as statutes 
[Statute] that would not be binding without his prior sanction [Befehl]) 
for then they would not be ethical laws, and the duty commensurate to 
them would not be free virtue but an enforceable legal duty.” The ser-
geant’s order seems to be an example of a command that proceeds origi-
nally merely from the will of a superior. The sergeant could have chosen 
to command differently, and had the sergeant not commanded the private 
to dig the ditch, then the private would not have had an obligation to do 
so. Moreover, the private’s obligation is an enforceable duty. So in saying 
that moral duties do not proceed originally merely from the will of God, 
Kant again seems to be aware that regarding duties as divine commands 
requires some appeal to the divine will. But again he stresses that the 
divine will is not to be conceived like the will of the sergeant who orders 
the private to dig a ditch.
We saw earlier that Kant conceives of the divine will as holy, as neces-
sarily operating morally perfectly. It would be wrong, however, to think 
that we first form a conception of the divine will, and we then think of that 
will as holy. Rather what comes first is our concept of a necessarily mor-
ally perfect will, and our notion of divinity is taken from that. Thus there 
can be no divergence between what we affirm as divinely willed and what 
we affirm as in accordance with the moral law. In this respect, the divine 
will is clearly different from any particular human authority. To illustrate: 
given that killing one’s own son is in violation of the moral law, we can 
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be absolutely certain, in advance of any other information, that God did 
not will a father to kill his son. The same cannot be said for any human 
authority.52
All of this suggests a way of understanding what it means to conceive 
of one’s moral duties as divine commands. The dutiful Kantian religious 
person acts morally out of respect for the moral law. At the same time, she 
recognizes that the moral law is the necessary principle of the divine will. 
She thereby expands her overall understanding of morality to include the 
idea of an omnipotent and perfectly-lawful will that is capable of bringing 
about the highest good.53 This rational idea of the divine will combines 
(a) our conceptually prior understanding of moral perfection with (b) the 
notion of a cause sufficient to bring about the highest good, which moral-
ity commands. As Kant says: “[T]he concept of the Divinity actually origi-
nates solely from the consciousness of these [purely moral] laws and from 
reason’s need to assume a power capable of procuring for them the full 
effect possible in this world in conformity with the moral final end.”54 To 
think of one’s duties as divine commands is to think of them in light of the 
fact that the moral law—which is a formal principle that pure practical rea-
son gives to itself—is also the necessary principle of the divine will, which 
is a cause capable of bringing morality to fruition in the highest good. 
However, to think of the moral law this way is not to think of the moral 
law as having a normative grounding in God’s practical authority over us. 
Nor is it to fulfill one’s moral duties because God commands them. In that 
sense, the Kantian religious person does not act from obedience to God 
per se. Rather she acts from respect for the moral law, with the awareness 
that the law is also the necessary principle of the divine will. And thus we 
can describe her motivational structure this way: She acts both from duty 
and in hope—a hope for attaining the highest good, which she grasps as 
warranted because of her awareness that the very moral law for which she 
has respect is also the necessary principle of an all-powerful will.
This interpretation of the Kantian religious person faces a textual 
challenge that needs to be addressed. In at least one passage, Kant spe-
cifically refers to obedience to God: “Since all religion consists in this, 
that in our duties we look upon God to be honored universally, the 
determination of religion, so far as the conformity of our conduct with 
it is concerned, comes down to knowing how God wills to be honored 
(and obeyed).”55 This suggests that, after all, the attitude of the Kantian 
religious person acts from obedience. But this appearance is misleading. 
52Religion 6:87. Kant is alluding, of course, to Abraham and Isaac.
53“But now, if the strictest observance of the moral laws is to be thought of as the cause of 
ushering in the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does not suffice to effect 
happiness in the world proportionate to the worthiness to be happy, an omnipotent moral 
being must be assumed as ruler of the world, under whose care this would come about, i.e., 
morality inevitably leads to religion” (Religion 6:8).
54Kant, Religion, 6:104.
55Kant, Religion, 6:103–104.
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In the paragraph that follows this sentence, Kant distinguishes between 
merely statutory and purely moral laws. He is clear that so far as there 
is a way to honor God that is universally valid for humans as such, this 
honoring concerns only “pure moral legislation, through which God’s 
will is originally engraved in our hearts.”56 And earlier in the same sec-
tion, Kant makes the following criticism of those who follow a religion 
of divine service:
They cannot indeed conceive their obligation except as directed to some ser-
vice or other which they must perform for God – wherein what matters is 
not the intrinsic worth of their actions as much as, rather, that they are per-
formed for God to please him through passive obedience, however morally 
indifferent the actions might be in themselves. It does not enter their heads 
that, whenever they fulfill their duties toward human beings (themselves 
and others), by that fact they also conform to God’s commands; hence, that 
in all their doings and non-doings, so far as these have reference to morality, 
they are constantly in the service of God.57
What is noteworthy about this passage is that when Kant speaks about 
the true service of God, which involves moral not statutory laws, he does 
not distinguish between: (a) obedience to divine commands, and (b) doing 
what fulfills the content of a divine command. Or rather: Kant says that 
what matters for genuine service to God is not obedience per se but ful-
filling the content of the command—“conforming” to the command by 
doing one’s moral duty. This suggests that when Kant uses the language 
obedience to God in the following paragraph, what he has in mind is not 
obedience to God strictly speaking—i.e., he is not thinking of persons who 
fulfill their duties because God commands them and from respect for 
God’s practical authority.
With all this in mind, let us return to the earlier suggestion that the 
Kantian religious person is analogous to the private who has more than 
one decisive reason to dig the ditch—both because it will prevent a 
flood, and because he has been commanded to do so. We can now see 
why this is a misleading analogy. In the case of the private, there are 
two types of normative consideration involved: one relates to a good 
result that is to be brought about (preventing a flood), and the other 
is based in the sergeant’s practical authority. Moreover, the sergeant’s 
authoritative command is not the same thing as the fact that digging 
the ditch is a good idea because it will prevent a flood. But matters are 
different with the moral law and the divine will. Divine commands are 
not a different type of normative consideration, added to the norma-
tivity of the moral law. Nor are there are two different things that can 
be thought of separately, as if the moral law were one thing and the 
divine will another. Rather, when the Kantian religious person is led 
from morality to religion, she comes to see that the moral law is the 
56Kant, Religion, 6:104. Kant’s language here is an echo of Romans 2:15.
57Kant, Religion, 6:103.
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necessary principle of the will of a being who is omniscient, omnipo-
tent, holy, and just.58
5. No Divine Commands After All?
If recognizing duties as divine commands does not involve acting out 
of obedience to God, then it is much easier to reconcile the attitude of 
the Kantian religious person with Kant’s other claims about morality. 
However, we face a different problem. If the Kantian religious person 
does not act out of obedience to God, then it seems she is merely thinking 
of her duties as being in harmony with God’s will, rather than as divine 
commands. Earlier we noted that even if you do something in the knowl-
edge that you are doing what God wills you to do, this is not the same as 
obedience; it is not doing it because God wills you to do it. We now face the 
same point viewed from the other end. If you do not act from obedience, 
then even if you act in the knowledge that what you are doing is what God 
wills you to do, you are not treating the divine will as a source of author-
itative commands. You are simply seeing your will as being in harmony 
with the divine will.59
In response to this worry, we might point out that, in fulfilling her 
duties, the Kantian religious person does not see her will as being merely 
in harmony with the divine will. It is not as if her will is one thing, and 
the divine will is another, and the two happen to coincide. For she also 
thinks of that divine will as a cause capable of bringing about the highest 
good, happiness in proportion to virtue. And she aims to attain the high-
est good. So the Kantian religious person sees herself as dependent upon 
the divine will for achieving her aim (an aim required by morality), and 
she hopes for the proper proportioning of happiness and virtue that only 
the divine will can achieve.
That said, I  think a defender of Kantian religion should concede that 
when we speak about regarding duties as divine commands, we are 
speaking loosely. We are using a notion of command that is crucially dif-
ferent from the type of command issued by authorities such as sergeants, 
parents, or political rulers. For once we understand the role that God plays 
in Kantian religion, we see that God is not functioning like a practical 
authority of the familiar sort. Nor does the central attitude of the Kantian 
58“Now the human being as a secure foundation on which he can build his faith in 
God . . . He tries to act according to the duties he finds grounded in his own nature; but he 
also has senses which present the opposite to him with a blinding bedazzlement, and if he 
had no further incentives and powers to resist it, then he would in the end be blinded by 
their dazzle. Hence in order that he may not act against his own powers, he is set by his own 
reason to think of a being whose will is those very commands which he recognzies to be given by 
themselves a priori with apodictic certainty” (Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion 
28:102: first emphasis added).
59Cf. Wood, “Religion, Ethical Community, and Evil,” 501: “Second, although we may 
hope to attain the highest good only if our will is in harmony with God’s will, it has not yet 
been explained why we should think of this harmony specifically as our obedience to com-
mands issued by God’s will.”
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religious person involve obedience to God in the ordinary sense of obedi-
ence. And thus the relevant idea of command must be quite different from 
ordinary commands. Indeed, it is so different that one might reasonably 
think it is misleading for Kant to speak about divine commands, rather 
than harmony with, and dependence upon, the divine will.
Interpreted this way, Kant turns out to be less of a divine command the-
orist than some of his passages suggest—and less a divine command theo-
rist than scholars like Hare have argued. However, this interpretation does 
not make God any less important for Kantian morality, or turn Kant into 
a more “secular” philosopher.60 Moreover, it has the benefit of allowing us 
to describe the characteristic attitude of the Kantian religious person—to 
say what she thinks about moral duties and God—in a way that avoids 
inconsistencies with Kant’s other claims about morality. The alternative, it 
seems to me, is to grant that Kantian religion really is incoherent.61
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